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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW: AT LONG LAST, A
LONG LOOK AT RESPONDENTS IN DISCOVERY
Marc D. Ginsberg'

I. INTRODUCTION
Since 19762 the respondent in discovery ("RID")3 has been an oddity
of Illinois civil procedure. It is a creature of statute5 and seems to have no
counterpart in the law of Illinois' sister states.6 It is not recognized by
federal district courts in Illinois as part of federal civil procedure.7 It began
as an accommodation to physicians8 and now applies to all civil cases.9
The RID statute provides a process which appears, perhaps, as a
distant relative of the pre-suit discovery process governed by Illinois

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

8.
9.

Visiting Professor of Law, appointed to Tenure Track as Assistant Professor effective August 15,
2011, The John Marshall Law School (Chicago), (9ginsberg@jmls.edu). B.A., University of
Illinois-Chicago; M.A., Indiana University; J.D., The John Marshall Law School; L.L.M.(Health
Law) DePaul University College of Law. The author thanks his wife, Janice Ginsberg, for her
inspiration and support. The author also thanks his research assistants Jennifer Barton and Levon
Barsoumian for their cite checking and proofreading efforts.
ILL. REV. STAT. § 110-21.1 (1976 Supp.).
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402 (2010). This is the current statute.
The Illinois Code of Civil Procedure is found at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-101 et seq. (2010).
In re Marriage of Sanfratello, 393 Ill. App. 3d 641, 658, 913 N.E.2d 1077, 1092 (1st Dist. 2009)
(noting that section 2-402 encompasses a statutory right unknown at common law).
Interestingly, a respondent in discovery statute has been proposed in Arizona by Representative
Heinz as H. 2519, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011). Representative Heinz is a physician by
training. See Bio: Rep. Matthew Heinz, CONGRESS.ORG, http://www.congress.org/bio/id/158381
(last visited July 5, 2011).
Murphy v. Schering Corp., 878 F. Supp. 124, 126 (N.D. 111.1995) (holding that 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/2-402 does not provide a basis for including a physician as a party litigant-joinder is
controlled by the federal rules of civil procedure); Stull v. YTB Int'l, No. 10-600-GPM, 2010 WL
3702424 at *2 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2010); Ebersohl v. Bechtel Corp., No. 09-1029-GPM, 2010 WL
2164451at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ill. May 31, 2010); Lee v. Burlington N., No. 07 cv 5829, 2008 WL
4874052 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 2008); Sargent v. Cottrell, Inc., No. 06-cv-1042-MJR, 2007 WL
4115811 at *2-3 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2007); Montclair-Bohl v. Janssen Pharm., No. 06 C 2166,
2006 WL 2700013 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2006). But see Roe v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 815 F.
Supp. 244 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
See Murphy v. Giardina, 82 Ill.2d 529, 532, 413 N.E.2d 399, 400 (1980). Justice Moran includes
in his opinion a history of the respondent in discovery statute. Id. at 532, 413 N.E.2d at 400-01.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402 (2010) (noting that "the plaintiff in any civil action may designate
as respondents in discovery. . . ."). For examples of non-medical negligence cases, see Evans v.
Lima Lima Flight Team, 373 Ill. App. 3d 407, 409, 869 N.E.2d 195, 198 (1st Dist. 2007). See
also Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Olsak, 391 Ill. App. 3d 295, 297, 908 N.E.2d 1091, 1094 (1st Dist.
2009).
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Supreme Court Rule 224.10 The RID statute, however, does not concern
pre-suit discovery. It involves persons and entities in pending litigation
who are designated as RIDs, but they are not parties." Yet, RIDs are
subject to discovery as if they are parties. They are served with process as
if they are defendants.12 Indeed, RIDs have been characterized as "hybrid
litigant[s]."1

Despite its endurance for thirty-five years, the RID statute has not
been closely studied.14 That is the purpose of this paper.
II. THE RESPONDENT IN DISCOVERY STATUTE-735 ILCS 5/2402
The RID statute, a component of the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure,'s provides as follows:
Sec. 2-402. Respondents in discovery. The plaintiff in any civil
action may designate as respondents in discovery in his or her pleading
those individuals or other entities, other than the named defendants,
believed by the plaintiff to have information essential to the determination
of who should properly be named as additional defendants in the action.
Persons or entities so named as respondents in discovery shall be
required to respond to discovery by the plaintiff in the same manner as are
defendants and may, on motion of the plaintiff, be added as defendants if
the evidence discloses the existence of probable cause for such action.

10.
11.

12.
13.
14.

ILL. SUP. CT. R. 224 (2011).
See Shanklin v. Hutzler, 294 Ill. App. 3d 659, 666, 691 N.E.2d 7, 12 (1st Dist. 1997); Shanklin v.
Hutzler, 277 Ill. App. 3d 94, 100, 660 N.E.2d 103, 106 (1st Dist. 1995); Delestowicz v. Labinsky,
288 Ill. App. 3d 637, 639, 681 N.E.2d 1008,1009 (1st Dist. 1997).
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402 (2010).
Coyne v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 332 111.App. 3d 717, 719, 773 N.E.2d 732, 735 (3d Dist. 2002).
For an excellent early look at RIDs, see Mary P. Tobin, Respondents in Discovery: A Pre-Suit
Answer to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 11 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 833 (1980). A number of papers
have commented upon RIDs but are not solely focused on the topic. See, e.g., Edward J. Kionka,
Things To Do (or Not) to Address the Medical MalpracticeInsurance Problem, 26 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 469 (2006); Garrett P. Hoerner & Stephen R. Wigginton, Survey of Illinois Law: Civil
Procedure, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 859 (1999); Brad A. Elward, Survey of Illinois Law: Civil
Procedure,21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 691 (1997); Stephen J. Heine & Robert V. Dewey, Survey ofillinois
Law: Tort Development, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 915 (1996); Jill Adams, Survey of Illinois Law: Civil
Procedure,20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 697 (1996); Beth C. Boggs, Survey of Illinois Law: Civil Procedure,
19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 683 (1995); JEFFREY A. PARNESS, ILLINOIS CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.02[9], 214-15
(3d ed. 2008). See also Edward J. Walsh & Elizabeth Farmer, "Empty Chair" / Sole Proximate
Cause Defense and Respondents in Discovery, 2011 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TRIAL NOTEBOOK

15.

(2010).
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402 (2010).
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A person or entity named a respondent in discovery may upon his or
her own motion be made a defendant in the action, in which case the
provisions of this Section are no longer applicable to that person.
A copy of the complaint shall be served on each person or entity
named as a respondent in discovery.
Each respondent in discovery shall be paid expenses and fees as
provided for witnesses.
A person or entity named as a respondent in discovery in any civil
action may be made a defendant in the same action at any time within 6
months after being named as a respondent in discovery, even though the
time during which an action may otherwise be initiated against him or her
may have expired during such 6 month period. An extension from the
original 6-month period for good cause may be granted only once for up
to 90 days for (i) withdrawal of plaintiffs counsel or (ii) good cause.
Notwithstanding the limitations in this Section, the court may grant
additional reasonable extensions from this 6-month period for a failure or
refusal on the part of the respondent to comply with timely filed
discovery.
The plaintiff shall serve upon the respondent or respondents a copy of
the complaint together with a summons in a form substantially as follows:
STATE OF ILLINOIS
COUNT OF
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF

COUNTY, ILLINOIS

COUNTY DEPARTMENT, LAW DIVISION
(or, In the Circuit Court of the

Judicial Circuit)

Plaintiff(s),
V.

No.

HeinOnline -- 35 S. Ill. U. L.J. 705 2010-2011
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Defendant(s),
PLEASE SERVE:

and

Respondent(s) in Discovery.
SUMMONS FOR DISCOVERY
TO RESPONDENT IN DISCOVERY
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that on

,

20_,

a

complaint, a copy of which is attached, was filed in the above Court
naming you as a Respondent in Discovery. Pursuant to the Illinois Code of
Civil Procedure Section 2-402 and Supreme Court Rules 201 et. Seq.,
and/or Court Order entered on

_

_

, the above named Plaintiff(s)

are authorized to proceed with the discovery of the named Respondent(s)
in Discovery.
YOU ARE SUMMONED AND COMMANDED to appear for
deposition, before a notary public (answer the attached written
interrogatories), (respond to the attached request to produce), (or other
appropriate discovery tool). We are scheduled to take the oral deposition
of the above named Respondent,

, on

, 20_,

at the hour of_ a.m./p.m., at the office of
,Illinois,
in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Court. Witness and
are attached (or)
mileage fees in the amount of_
(serve the following interrogatories,

request to produce, or other

to be
appropriate discovery tool upon Respondent, _
, and delivered to
answered under oath by Respondent,
, Illinois, within 28 days from the date of
the office of

service).
TO THE OFFICER/SPECIAL PROCESS SERVER:
This summons must be returned by the officer or other person to
whom it was given for service, with endorsement or affidavit of service
and fees and an endorsement or affidavit of payment to the Respondent of
witness and mileage fees, if any, immediately after service. If service
cannot be made, this summons shall be returned so endorsed.
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WITNESS,

Clerk of Court
Date of Service:

, 20

(To be inserted by officer on copy left with Respondent or other person)
Attorney No.
Name:
Attorney for:
Address:
City/State/Zip:
Telephone:.
This amendatory Act of the 94t General Assembly applies to causes
of action pending on or after its effective date.16
It has been suggested that the RID statute is largely "clear and
concise," 7 with "straightforward" "procedural requirements,"' 8 but these
suggestions are not accurate. The statute provides a vehicle for obtaining
discovery from non-party' 9 persons or entities20 who are designated as
RIDs 2 1 in a complaint. 22 Beyond that, the RID statute raises far more
questions than it answers, such as:

16.
17.
18.

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Bradley C. Nahrstadt & John E. Newton, Understanding the Illinois Respondent in Discovery
Statute, 18 DUPAGE CTY. BAR Ass'N BRIEF 10 (May 2006).
Id. See also Nicholas C. Dranias, The Illinois Misnomer Statute: A Refuge for Suits Against
Unknown or Fictitious Entities or a Tool for Correcting Technical Naming Errors?, 16 CBA
RECORD 39 (May 2002) (erroneously suggesting that the RID statute provides for a "complaint
for discovery").
See Shanklin v. Hutzler, 277 Ill. App. 3d 94, 96, 660 N.E.2d 103, 104 (1st Dist. 1995); Jass v.
Prudential Health Care Plan, 88 F.3d 1482, 1485 n.2 (7th Cir. 1996).
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402.
Id.
Roth v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 241 Ill. App. 3d 407, 416, 607 N.E.2d 1356, 1362 (5th Dist. 1993)
(stating that "section 2-402 allows full discovery of those named as respondents in discovery once
a lawsuit against at least one defendant is filed.").
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When is a respondent in discovery designated or named?
Is a respondent in discovery a party?
Can a respondent in discovery file an appearance?
Can a respondent in discovery file pleadings?
Can a respondent in discovery attend court hearings?
Can a respondent in discovery attend and participate in depositions of
parties, witnesses and other RIDs?
What is the definition of probable cause for conversion from RID
status to defendant?
Whether a complaint may name RIDs and no defendants and remain
viable?
Whether an RID is entitled to counsel?
May an RID be converted to a defendant if no discovery is sought
from and taken from the RID?
How does an RID obtain status termination if there is a failure of
probable cause to convert or the conversion period expires?
What is the appropriate subject matter of RID discovery?
What is the RID conversion procedure?
Is a former RID subject to additional written/oral discovery upon
conversion to a defendant?
What occurs when the RID conversion period expires but the statute
of limitations has not expired?
What are "reasonable" extensions of time for RID conversion?
These questions are numerous and hit at the very heart of the statute.
They raise serious doubts about the time and effort invested in drafting the
RID statute. Perhaps these questions are answerable by statutory inference
or Illinois case law. In any event, a comprehensive review of the law of
RIDs is long overdue.23
III. STATUTORY HISTORY AND PURPOSE
As previously mentioned, the Illinois legislature gave birth to the RID
statute in 1976.24 That statute provided as follows:
The plaintiff in any action based on an allegation of negligence in the
performance of health care services may designate as respondents in
discovery in his pleading those individuals, 25 other than the named

23.
24.
25.

See Tobin, supra note 14 (including a discussion of the RID statute in its infancy).
ILL. REV. STAT. § 110-21.1 (1976).
The original version of the RID statute and the 1985 version limited respondents in discovery to
"individuals." The appellate court in Perry v. Rush Pres. St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 178 Ill. App. 3d
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defendants, believed by him to have information essential to the
determination of who should properly be named as additional defendants
in the action.
Persons so named as respondents in discovery shall be required to
respond to discovery by the plaintiff in the same manner as are defendants
and may, on motion of the plaintiff, be added as defendants if the evidence
discloses the existence of probable cause for such action.
A person named a respondent in discovery may upon his own motion
be made a defendant in the action, in which case the provisions of this
Section are no longer applicable to that person.
A copy of the complaint shall be served on each person named as a
respondent in discovery.
Each respondent in discovery shall be paid expenses and fees as
provided for witnesses.
A person named as a respondent in discovery in any civil action may
be made a defendant in the same action at any time within 6 months after
he is named as a respondent in discovery, even though the time during
which an action may otherwise be initiated against him may have expired
during such 6 month period.26
Case law confirms that the RID statute was enacted to relieve the
stress imparted upon physicians when named as defendants in medical
negligence actions.27 The appellate court has specifically noted that:
The legislative history of section 2-402 indicates that its purpose was to
provide plaintiffs attorneys with a means of filing medical malpractice
suits without naming everyone in sight as a defendant. It was believed that
the label of 'defendant' in a medical malpractice suit contributed to the
spiraling cost of medical malpractice insurance. (See transcript of
proceedings, House of Representatives, June 10, 1976, pages 32-33).28

It has been suggested that the RID statute "was enacted for the
purpose of reducing the number of malpractice suits by providing for pre-

26.
27.
28.

564, 568, 533 N.E.2d 437, 439 (1st Dist. 1988), noted that "[h]ospitals have an enormous
potential for malpractice liability and are generally the first party named in a suit because the
plaintiff was a patient in the hospital at the time the negligence occurred. [citation omitted]
Accordingly, we believe the purpose of the statute would be carried out by allowing hospitals to
be named as respondents in discovery." Id.
ILL. REV. STAT. § 110-21.1.
Clark v. Brokaw Hosp., 126 Ill. App. 3d 779, 783, 467 N.E.2d 652, 655 (4th Dist. 1984).
Id.

HeinOnline -- 35 S. Ill. U. L.J. 709 2010-2011

710

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 35

suit discovery." 29 Of course, "pre-suit"30 is really a misnomer insofar as an
RID is named in a filed complaint. The lawsuit is underway. Another
commentator has referred to a pre-statute practical problem suffered by
physicians, which is their displeasure "when local newspapers reported that
they had been sued for malpractice."" The RID statute was a response to a
perceived medical malpractice crisis. 32 This remains a topic of heated
discussion.
IV. DESIGNATING THE RESPONDENT IN DISCOVERY
The RID statute does not clearly identify the method by which a
"plaintiff in any civil action may designate in his or her pleading those
individuals or other entities, other than the named defendants, believed by
the plaintiff to have information essential to the determination of who
should properly be named as additional defendants in the action."34
Although the RID statute does not specify the pleading in which the RID
designation is made, surely the proper pleading in which the designation
occurs is plaintiffs complaint. 35 The statute does provide that the RID is to
be served a copy of the complaint,36 thus it is fair to interpret the RID
statute to require that the RID designation occur in the complaint. A
sample caption of the complaint is as follows:

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

34.
35.

36.

Tobin, supra note 14, at 11.
Id.
Kionka, supra note 14, at 26.
Tobin, supra note 14, at 11.
See Neil Vidmar, Russell M. Robinson & Kara MacKillop, "JudicialHellholes:" Medical
Malpractice Claims, Verdicts and the "Doctor Exodus" in Illinois, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1309
(2006). See also The Whole Truth About Medical Malpractice and Insurance, Ill. Trial Lawyers
Ass'n (Feb. 2010); The Whole Truth about the "Whole Truth, " ISMIE (March 2010).
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402 (2010).
Clark v. Brokaw Hosp., 126 111.App. 3d 779, 782, 467 N.E.2d 652, 655 (4th Dist. 1984) (noting
that the RID is first named in the complaint). See also Gonzales v. Pro Ambulance, 219 Ill. App.
3d 284, 286, 579 N.E.2d 1184, 1186 (4th Dist. 1991) (noting that the statute clearly indicates that
the RID may be named in a complaint).
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402.
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, LAW DIVISION

Sally Smith,
Plaintiff,
vs.
John Jones, M.D. and

XYZ Hospital,39

:=-

No 2011 L

Defendants,
and
Leo Lion, M.D.,4 0
Respondent In Discovery.

COMPLAINT

Special attention must be given to the RID statute's reference to "the
named defendants." 4 1 This reference raises the issue of the propriety of a
complaint naming only a fictitious defendant while actually designating
identifiable RIDs. This issue was phrased by an appellate court as follows:
"whether 'John Doe' may properly be considered a 'named defendant'
under section 2-402 is one of first impression in the state."42 This issue is a
close relative of the following: may plaintiff simply file a complaint naming
only respondents in discovery and no defendants? In 1994, the First
District Appellate Court held that the "named defendants" language of the

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Fictitious name supplied
Fictitious name supplied
Fictitious name supplied
Fictitious name supplied

by author.
by author.
by author.
by author.

735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402.

Bogseth v. Emanuel, 261 Ill. App. 3d 685, 688, 633 N.E.2d 904, 907 (1st Dist. 1994).
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RID was ambiguous and further held that a "John Doe" defendant would
satisfy the requirement of naming a defendant.4 3 Other appellate court
opinions have held that "complaints in discovery,"" naming no defendants,
fictitious or otherwise, are improper.4 5 Therefore, the inquiry is whether a
realistic interpretation of the RID statute is to equate a "John Doe," or
fictitious defendant, with a named defendant. It is not. The "John Doe" or
fictitious defendant is merely a "placeholder" for an unnamed party
defendant which would allow the filing of a complaint within the applicable
limitations period. If the complaint naming a fictitious defendant and
respondents in discovery was filed at or near the expiration of the
limitations period, and the complaint was a nullity, when the limitations
period expired the cause of action would be extinguished. In medical and
hospital negligence actions, the most popular uses of the RID statute, there
are medical and hospital records available which provide the names of the
treating physicians and other treating health care providers. Plaintiff should
be obligated to identify at least one actual defendant in a complaint which
designates respondents in discovery. The RID statute should not relieve
plaintiff's counsel of the obligation to engage in pre-suit investigation.
On the assumption that a complaint, naming at least one identifiable
defendant and respondents in discovery is filed, the RID statute requires
each RID to be served with the complaint and summons. 46 Despite the
requirement of service of the complaint upon the RID, the RID is not a
party 47 and there is no action pending against the RID. 48 Nevertheless, once
the RID has been named "and service of summons has been properly
executed upon him, the court acquires in personam jurisdictionA9 over the
RID.so
Next, it is necessary to understand the relationship between the
designation of the RID in a complaint and the timeliness of the complaint.

43.
44.

45.

Id. at 692, 633 N.E.2d at 909.
Armour v. Peterson, 219 111.App. 3d 289, 290-91, 579 N.E.2d 1188, 1189 (4th Dist. 1991). See
also Gonzales v. Pro Ambulance, 219 111.App. 3d 284, 284, 579 N.E.2d 1184, 1184 (4th Dist.
1991); Jacobs v. Abbott, 213 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1001, 572 N.E.2d 1231, 1233 (5th Dist. 1991).
See Armour, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 291, 579 N.E.2d at 1189.

46.

735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402 (2010).

47.

Delestowicz v. Labinsky, 288 Ill. App. 3d 637, 639, 681 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (1st Dist. 1997). See
also Coyne v. OSF Healthcare, 332 Ill. App. 3d 717, 719, 773 N.E.2d 732, 735 (3d Dist. 2002).
See Delestowicz, 288 111. App. 3d at 639, 681 N.E.2d at 1010.
See Coyne, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 719, 773 N.E.2d at 734.
Whitley v. Lutheran Hosp., 73 111.App. 3d 763, 766, 392 N.E.2d 729, 733 (3d Dist. 1979). See
also In re Marriage of Sanfratello, 393 111.App. 3d 641, 659, 913 N.E.2d 1077, 1093 (1st Dist.
2009); Rhonda Wasserman, The Subpoena Power: Pennoyer's Last Vestige, 74 MINN. L. REV. 37,
105 (1989).

48.
49.
50.
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The case of Peoples Bank v. Bromenn HealthcareHospitals5' stands for the
proposition that an RID must be designated in a complaint filed before the
applicable statute of limitation or period of repose has expired. In Peoples
Bank,52 a pregnant woman was admitted to the defendant medical center in
June 2003 and three hours later delivered a child by cesarean section.s3 The
baby died the following morning. 5 4
Almost two years later (May 2005) a complaint was filed against
defendants, which was amended four months thereafter. "In January 2008,
plaintiffs filed an addendum to their amended complaint, designating"55
RIDs. The next month the RIDs filed motions to terminate their RID
status.56 The trial court agreed with the RIDs and granted the motions. On
appeal, the appellate court stated:
Section 2-402 also provides that (1) as long as a person or entity is
named as a respondent-in-discovery within the statute of limitations
period and (2) depending at what point in the statute-of-limitations period
plaintiff filed the complaint designating the person or entity as a
respondent-in-discovery, a plaintiff may have an additional six months
past the statute-of-limitations period to file a motion converting the
respondent-in-discovery into a defendant.
Here, the four-year statute of repose (and likely the two-year statute
of limitations) was triggered by Abigail's death on June 21, 2003. Thus,
the additional six-month period afforded Peoples Bank by section 2-402 of
the Code notwithstanding, it had until June 21, 2005, pursuant to the
statute of limitations, to designate additional respondents-in-discovery,
which it then could have converted into defendants. Even if the statute of
limitations had not been triggered by Abigail's death (a contention about
which we are skeptical), Peoples Bank would have been barred from
bringing any medical malpractice action after June 21, 2007. Because
Peoples Bank did not file the addendum to the amended complaint seeking
to designate appellees as respondents-in-discovery until January 2008, the
trial court did not err by granting appellees' respective motions to
terminate their respondents-in-discovery status.57

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Peoples Bank v. Bromenn Healthcare Hosp., 388 Il. App. 3d 1097, 905 N.E.2d 339 (4th Dist.
2009).
Id.
Id. at 1098, 905 N.E.2d at 340.
Id.
Id. at 1099, 905 N.E.2d at 341.
Id. It should be noted that the RID statute, neither expressly nor otherwise, provides for this
process.
Id. at 1102, 905 N.E.2d at 343.
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The trial court was affirmed. The RID designation did not occur in a
timely fashion.
It is important to note that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure neither
encompass nor recognize respondents in discovery. The RID statute is
simply inapplicable in federal court." This point is particularly significant
to a hypothetical case originally filed in Illinois state court, with RIDs
designated, and subsequently removed59 to federal court. Those previously
designated RIDs cannot be converted to defendants in the federal court
action. This matter has been explained in detail by the federal district court
60
in Montclair-Bohn v. Janssen Pharmaceutica.
Although the quoted
material is lengthy, its substantial republication here is meaningful,
particularly to counsel for prospective plaintiffs:
Joinder of defendants in federal cases is governed by Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure ("Rules") 19 and 20 and 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). Rule 19
addresses compulsory joinder . . . Like Rule 19, section 2-402 sets forth a
species of compulsory joinder, mandating that respondents in discovery be
joined as defendants, upon timely motion, if there is probable cause to
believe they are liable. Thus, section 2-402 is in direct conflict with both
Rule 19, which instructs courts to consider a variety of factors to
determine whether a defendant must be joined, and section 1447(e), which
grants courts discretion to deny joinder in removal cases. Because there is
a conflict between the state law and federal procedure, the Supremacy
Clause dictates that the latter controls.
Even if there were no conflict, section 2-402 would still not apply
because it is procedural, not substantive. . . .As originally enacted, section
2-402 applied to only one substantive are of the law-medical
malpractice.'
In 1989, however, the Illinois Legislature amended the
statutory language . .. section 2-402 now applies to all civil suits, not just
to suits that implicate one substantive area of the law.
. . . Even in the absence of section 2-402, plaintiffs can add
respondents as defendants in federal court pursuant to Rules 19 and 20 and

58.

59.
60.
61.

See Stull v. YTB Int'l, No. 10-600-GPM, 2010 WL 3702424 at *2 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2010). See
also Ebersohl v. Bechtel Corp., No. 09-1029-GPM, 2010 WL 2164451 at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ill. May
31, 2010); Lee v. Burlington N., No. 07 cv 5829, 2008 WL 4874052 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 2008);
Sargent v. Cottrell, Inc., No. 06-cv-1042-MJR, 2007 WL 4115811 at *2-3 (S.D. Il. Nov. 16,
2007); Montclair-Bohl v. Janssen Pharm., No. 06 C 2166, 2006 WL 2700013 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13,
2006); Morris v. Health Prof'ls, Ltd., No. 10-01227, 2011 WL 573799 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2011).
But see Roe v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 815 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2002).
See Montclair-Bohl,2006 WL 2700013.
See 1989 Ill. Legis. Serv. Pub. Act 86-843 (West).
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section 1447(e). Consequently, the availability of section 2-402 will not
give plaintiffs any incentive to choose one court system over the other.
... Respondents are not defendants in the lawsuit, so they have no
right to remove. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).... the only way a respondent
can "get into federal court" is by voluntarily joining the suit which...
would bring about the very result-their joinder-that removal to federal
court was supposed to avoid.
Not applying section 2-402 in federal court also would not encourage
defendants to remove.... it is far better for them if the risk of judgment is
spread among many defendants rather than limited to one.
Not applying the section to diversity cases also would not lead to
dissimilar results in similar cases because all referral courts would be
using the same joinder rules. If, however, section 2-402 is applied in

federal court, the outcome of a joinder motion may depend on the location
of the court. Illinois federal courts, who could not deny joinder in
accordance with section 1447(e), would be forced to permit diversitydestroying defendants to be joined and, as a result, to remand such cases
to state court. Federal courts in other states, however, would retain their
discretion to deny joinder, creating the potential for different joinder
decisions in similar cases in different federal courts.
In short, applying section 2-402 to diversity cases would be inconsistent
with both the Supremacy Clause and the Erie doctrine. Therefore the

Court declines to do so.62
Also worthy of mention is that the citizenship of an RID designated in an
Illinois state court, then removed to federal court, is irrelevant for purposes
of diversity.63
Finally, the appellate court has spoken to the relationship between
designation of the RID and an automobile insurance company's duty to

62.

63.

Montclair-Bohl,2006 WL 2700013 at *1-2. The court also said that "A substantive state law, the
Seventh Circuit has said, is one that is: (1) "'procedural' in the ordinary sense of the term, [but] is
limited to a particular substantive area"; or (2) so likely to dictate the outcomes of cases that, if
not applied in diversity cases, forum shopping or dissimilar decisions on similar cases may result,
and "so entwined with procedures prescribed by the federal rules that it is likely to impair the
integrity of federal procedure if it is applied in diversity cases." Id. Section 2-402 satisfies
neither test." Id. See also Murphy v. Schering Corp., 878 F. Supp. 124, 126 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
(noting that Illinois law provides substantive rules of decision in a diversity action but not
procedural rules).
Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, 88 F.3d 1482, 1485 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1996).
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defend.6' In Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Brumfield,s the court held

that since no damages were sought against an RID, the insurance company
had no duty to defend the RID based upon his designation in the
complaint.
V. DISCOVERY AND THE RESPONDENT IN DISCOVERY
The RID statute67 is not exceedingly helpful in explaining the RID's
role in the discovery process. The statute does provide an example of a
"Summons For Discovery,"68 and that summons specifically indicates that
the RID may be required to appear for a deposition, a discovery device
applicable to parties and non-parties, 6 9 answer interrogatories, otherwise
applicable only to parties70 and respond to a production request, otherwise
applicable only to parties. 7 1 The statute does provide that the RID "shall be
required to respond to discovery by the plaintiff in the same manner as are
defendants."72 Indeed, it has been held that the "action brought pursuant to
section 2-40273 provides for unilateral discovery by a plaintiff."7 4
However, the RID statute 75 does not explain the extent to which the
RID may participate in the discovery process, which will likely occur
simultaneously as to parties (and perhaps non-party witnesses) and RIDs.
Is the RID personally or by counsel entitled to attend and participate in
depositions of other RIDs, witnesses and parties? The RID statute7 6 does
provide that the RID "may upon his or her own motion be made a defendant
in the action."77 Construing "motion" broadly, the RID will want carefully
to avoid an unintentional conversion from RID to defendant by
participating in a deposition of another RID, party or witness. With no
guidance provided by the statute, the best advice is to obtain an advance
agreement of all counsel to allow the RID to fully participate without

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Econ. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Brumfield, 384 Ill. App. 3d 726, 730, 894 N.E.2d 421, 425 (4th Dist.
2008).
Id.
Id. at 731, 894 N.E.2d at 426.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402 (2010).
Id.
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 202 (2011).
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 213 (2011).
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 214 (2011).

72.

735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402.

73.
74.

Id.
Knapp v. Bulin, 392 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1025, 911 N.E.2d 541, 548 (1st Dist. 2009). See also
Froeblich v. Sheehan, 240 Ill. App. 3d 93, 103, 608 N.E.2d 889, 897 (1st Dist. 1993).
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402.
Id.
Id.
Id.

75.
76.
77.
78.
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jeopardizing the RID status. In this fashion, if the RID is later converted to
a defendant, the former RID may be able to avoid seeking re-depositions.
Although the RID statute7 9 suggests the purpose of RID discovery as
the search for "information essential to the determination of who should
properly be named as additional defendants in the action,"80 the statute does
not address whether an RID may be questioned about the standard of care,
liability or damages. Again, an agreement of counsel should be reached
about these topics.
Referring to the same provision of the RID statute as to the scope of
discovery, 82 the statute does not limit the discoverable information to the
designated RID. In other words, the statute83 does not prohibit plaintiff
from obtaining discovery from an RID which may implicate another RID or
defendant, or another person or entity not yet named as a defendant or RID.
Therefore, the RID may be subject to the range of discovery to which any
party or witness may be subject.
Although related to the conversion process to be discussed later in this
article, it should be noted that the RID statute does not mandate plaintiff to
seek discovery from a designated RID.8 4 The failure to seek discovery from
the RID will, therefore, not prejudice a plaintiff in the quest to convert the
RID to a defendant.
It should be noted that the scope of discovery permitted under the RID
statute is much broader than provided for by Illinois Supreme Court Rule
224,85 governing pre-suit discovery. Rule 224 provides:
(a) Procedure.
(1) Petition.

(i) A person or entity who wishes to engage in discovery for the sole
purpose of ascertaining the identity of one who may be responsible in
damages may file an independent action for such discovery.
(ii) The action for discovery shall be initiated by the filing of a verified
petition in the circuit court of the county in which the action or proceeding

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
See laccino v. Anderson, 406 Ill. App. 3d 397, 411-12, 940 N.E.2d 742, 755 (1st Dist. 2010)
(explaining the standard against which a defendant physician's conduct is measured).
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402.
Id.
Long v. Mathew, 336 fI. App. 3d 595, 602, 783 N.E.2d 1076, 1082 (4th Dist. 2003). See also
Torley v. Foster C. McGaw Hosp., 116 111. App. 3d 19, 21, 452 N.E.2d 7, 8 (1st Dist. 1983).
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 224 (2011).
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might be brought or in which one or more of the persons or entities from
whom discovery is sought resides. The petition shall be brought in the
name of the petitioner and shall name as respondents the persons or
entities from whom discovery is sought and shall set forth: (A) the reason
the proposed discovery is necessary and (B) the nature of the discovery
sought and shall ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to obtain such
discovery. The order allowing the petition will limit discovery to the
identification of responsible persons and entities and where a deposition is
sought will specify the name and address of each person to be examined,

if known, or, if unknown, information sufficient to identify each person
and the time and place of the deposition.
(2) Summons and Service. The petitioner shall serve upon the respondent
or respondents a copy of the petition together with a summons in a form
substantially as follows:

(b) Expiration and Sanctions. Unless extended for good cause, the order
automatically expires 60 days after issuance. The sanctions available

under Supreme Court Rule 219 may be utilized by a party initiating an
action for discovery under this rule or by a respondent who is the subject
of discovery under this rule.
(c) Expenses of Complying. The reasonable expenses of complying with
the requirements of the Order of Discovery shall be borne by the person or
entity seeking the discovery.86

The language of Supreme Court Rule 224 has been examined by the
appellate court, which concluded that the scope of discovery is limited to
the "identification process."87 "Once the identity of [potential defendants]
has been ascertained, the purpose of the rule has been accomplished and the
action shall be dismissed."8 In some circumstances, the petitioner referred
to in Rule 224 may be entitled to obtain "knowledge of the connection of an
individual to the injury involved .... "8 9 Unlike the RID statute, Rule 224
does not contain a conversion process and appears to have no impact on an
applicable statute of limitations or repose. 90

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Roth v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 241 Ill. App. 3d 407, 413, 607 N.E.2d 1356, 1359 (5th Dist. 1993).
Id.
Beale v. EdgeMark Fin. Corp., 279 I. App. 3d 242, 252, 664 N.E.2d 302, 308 (1st Dist. 1996).
Roth, 241 Ill. App. 3d at 409-10, 607 N.E.2d at 1358 (referring to the expiration date for statute of
limitations).
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VI. OTHER INVOLVEMENT OF RESPONDENTS IN DISCOVERY
As previously noted, RIDs are not parties. 9' The RID "statute does
not require [RIDs] to file appearances or answer in any other manner before
plaintiff has initiated discovery."9 2 More precisely, the RID statute simply
does not authorize the RID to file appearances or other pleadings. RIDs, as
non-parties, cannot file motions to dismiss.93 Nevertheless, some RIDs
erroneously file motions to dismiSS9 4 and at least one appellate opinion has
referred to a trial court having entered an order dismissing an RID.95
The RID statute9 6 "provides for unilateral discovery by the plaintiff'97
and, implicitly, suggests that the only authorized filings by the RID are
responses to written discovery requests (answers to interrogatories,
responses to production requests). It is traditional that RIDs are represented
by counsel and that appearances on behalf of RIDs are filed. A special
appearance is not appropriate despite having been recognized as a tactic
by an appellate court. 99 An appearance filed on behalf of the RID, a
strategy not explicitly prohibited by the RID statute, will entitle the RID's
counsel to receive notices and pleadings filed by other participants in the
case. It will allow the RID's counsel to follow the progress of the case and
communicate more effectively with the RID regarding cases status.
VII. CONVERTING THE RESPONDENT IN DISCOVERY TO A
DEFENDANT
The process by which an RID is converted to a defendant is,
undoubtedly, the most significant aspect of the RID statute. This portion of
the statute provides:

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

99.

Shanklin v. Hutzler, 277 111.App. 3d 94, 100, 660 N.E.2d 103, 106 (1st Dist. 1995). See also
Delestowicz v. Labinsky, 288 Ill. App. 3d 637, 639, 681 N.E.2d 1008, 1009 (1st Dist. 1997).
Browning v. Jackson Park Hosp., 163 Ill. App. 3d 543, 547, 516 N.E.2d 797, 800 (1st Dist. 1987).
Shanklin, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 665-66, 691 N.E.2d at 14.
Cutler v. Nw. Suburban Cmty. Hosp., 405 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1056, 939 N.E.2d 1032, 1036 (2d
Dist. 2010).
Id.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402 (2010).
Knapp v. Bulin, 392 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1024, 911 N.E.2d 541, 547 (1st Dist. 2009).
It should be noted that the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure no longer refers to a "special
appearance" limited to challenging the court's jurisdiction. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-301 (2010).
See PARNESS, supra note 14, at 117-18.
See Coley v. St. Bernard's Hosp., 281 111.App. 3d 587, 594, 667 N.E.2d 493, 498 (1st Dist. 1996).
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A person or entity named as a respondent in discovery in any civil
action may be made a defendant in the same action at any time within 6
months after being named as a respondent in discovery, even though the
time during which an action may otherwise be initiated against him or her
may have expired during such 6 month period. An extension from the
original 6-month period for good cause may be granted only once for up
to 90 days for (i) withdrawal of plaintiffs counsel or (ii) good cause.
Notwithstanding the limitations in this Section, the court may grant
additional reasonable extensions from this 6-month period for a failure or
refusal on the part of the respondent to comply with timely filed
discovery.100

An RID must be designated in a complaint filed before the expiration
of the applicable statute of limitations or repose period.' 0' "The six-month
period in which a respondent in discovery may be converted to a defendant
begins to run on the day the complaint [naming the RID] is filed." 0 2 This
is significant as counsel may erroneously believe the RID designation date
is triggered by service of process.
For a plaintiff to seek conversion of the RID to a defendant, a motion
for conversion must be filed. 0 3 Filing of the motion, not the mailing of
it,104 must occur within the six month conversion period. 05 If the motion
for conversion is timely filed, the RID may be converted to a defendant
even if the hearing on the motion to convert is not held until after the
conversion period.'06 An important practice point is that the motion to
convert the RID to defendant cannot be set as a routine motion'0 7 "because
asking a court to rule on a motion as routine tells the court that it need not
make any evidentiary determinations, a message . . .

contrary to the

statute's mandate." 0 8 Therefore, the statutory provision that RIDs "may,
on motion of the plaintiff, be added as defendants if the evidence discloses
the existence of probable cause" 1 09 requires an evidentiary hearing." 0
The RID statute, however, does not well define the evidence necessary
to convert an RID to a defendant."' What, then, is the evidentiary standard

100. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402 (2010).
101. See Peoples Bank, supra note 50.
102. Knapp, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 1024, 911 N.E.2d at 548. See also Brown v. Jaimovich, 365 111.App.
3d 329, 339, 847 N.E.2d 870, 878 (1st Dist. 2006).
103. See Knapp, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 1026, 911 N.E.2d at 549.
104. Id.
105. Clark v. Brokaw Hosp., 126 Ill. App. 3d 779, 782, 467 N.E.2d 652, 654-55 (4th Dist. 1984).
106. Id.
107. Froehlich v. Sheehan, 240 Ill. App. 3d 93, 99, 608 N.E.2d 889, 894 (1st Dist. 1993).
108. Id. at 102, 608 N.E.2d at 896.
109. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402 (2010).
110. Froehlich,240 Ill. App. 3d 93, 99, 608 N.E.2d at 894.
111. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402.
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of "probable cause"? Probable cause for conversion is shown when "a man
of ordinary caution and prudence would entertain an honest and strong
suspicion that the purported negligence of the respondent in discovery was
a proximate cause of plaintiffs injury."ll 2 This is not the degree of
evidence involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment'"3 and
does not require plaintiff to demonstrate a prima facie case,' 14 as would be
necessary at trial. The burden, therefore, is not particularly harsh. "The
probable cause requirements of section 2-402 should be liberally construed
to the end that controversies may be determined according to the
substantive rights of the parties."" 15 Of course, this simply suggests that
plaintiffs need not endure much pain in the conversion process.
What evidence is enough to warrant the conversion of the RID to a
defendant? Certainly, if plaintiffs counsel obtains the required health
professional's report and provides the attorney's affidavit necessary to
satisfy the section 2-622 filing requirements,"' 6 a trial court will grant the
request for conversion.1 17 Short of section 2-62218 compliance, a court
may consider an attorney's affidavit regarding opinions of consulting
physicians,"l 9 medical records1 20 and the deposition testimony of the RID'21
as evidence to support probable cause for conversion of the RID to a
defendant. Again, the conversion process does not require a plaintiff to
overcome a very high hurdle.12 2
The six-month conversion period is subject to extensions of time, but
the statutory language is clumsy.1 23 The statute provides for a one time
"good cause" extension, defined as resulting from the withdrawal of
plaintiff's counsel or good cause.' 24 Essentially, this provision defines
"good cause" as "good cause." 2 5 Any subsequent extensions of the

112. Ingle v. Hosp. Sisters Health Sys., 141 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 1061-62,491 N.E.2d 139, 142 (4th Dist.
1986). See also Froehlich, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 100, 608 N.E.2d at 894.
113. Ingle, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 1065, 491 N.E.2d at 144.
114. Id. at 1065, 491 N.E.2d at 144.
115. Jackson-Baker v. Immesoete, 337 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 1095, 787 N.E.2d 874, 879 (3d Dist. 2003).
116. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-622 (2010).
117. Long v. Mathew, 336 Ill. App. 3d 595, 604, 783 N.E.2d 1076, 1083 (4th Dist. 2003); Williams v.
Medenica, 275 Ill. App. 3d 269, 273, 655 N.E.2d 1002, 1005 (1st Dist. 1995).
118. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-622 (2010).
119. See Coley v. St. Bernard's Hosp., 281 Ill. App. 3d 587, 593-94, 667 N.E.2d 493, 498 (1st Dist.
1996).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/2-402 (stating that "notwithstanding the limitations of this section, the
court may grant additional reasonable extensions from this 6-month period. . .
124. Id.
125. Id. (stating that "an extension from the original 6-month period for good cause may be granted
only once for up to 90 days for (i) ... or (ii) good cause.").
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conversion period, apparently limitless in number, may be granted only if
the RID fails or refuses to respond to appropriate discovery requests.126
The first extension, for good cause, may be up to ninety days.' 27 That
extension may occur simply due to the built-in delay with the representation
of the RID by counsel and obtaining the necessary materials from which to
respond to written discovery requests. Difficulty in scheduling discovery
depositions, particularly of physicians, may add to the delay and provide
the basis for extensions of the six month conversion period. The result is
that the conversion period, including extensions of time, may not elapse
until the passage of a considerable period of time. To the extent that RIDs
may believe that the statute provides for a quick determination of their
ultimate status, that belief is mistaken.
It has been suggested that the six month conversion period is not
capable of extension.128 The current RID statute, as amended in 2006,
includes provisions for extension of the conversion period and became
effective after the authority suggesting that the conversion period could not
be extended. 130
The RID statute does not speak to the interesting situation in which
RID
is not converted to a defendant within the six month conversion
the
period but the applicable statute of limitations has not yet expired.' 3' Here,
the argument is that if plaintiffs counsel chooses the vehicle of the RID
statute, that is the only vehicle by which the RID may become a defendant,
i.e., conversion to a defendant within the statutorily mandated conversion
period.
Despite the position that "[s]crupulous adherence to the requirements
of section 2-402 is a condition precedent to the plaintiff['s] right to seek a
remedy," 32 the appellate court has rejected the position that the expiration
of the six-month conversion period trumps a remaining limitations
period.'33 This merits some explanation as the appellate court's opinion in
Flores v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hospitall34 has profoundly impacted the

application of the RID statute.

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See PARNESS, supra note 14, at 214 (citing Robinson v. Johnson, 346 Ill. App. 3d 895, 906, 809
N.E.2d 123, 132 (1st Dist. 2004)).
129. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402 (2010).
130. Robinson v. Johnson, 346 Ill. App. 3d 895, 906, 809 N.E.2d 123, 132 (1st Dist. 2004).
131. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402.
132. Knapp v. Bulin, 392 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1024,911 N.E.2d 541, 548 (1st Dist. 2009).
133. Flores v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp., 149 Ill. App. 3d 371, 376, 502 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1st Dist. 1986).
See also Arndt v. Resurrection Hosp., 163 Ill. App. 3d 209, 215, 517 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1st Dist. 1987).
134. See Flores, 149 111. App. 3d 371, 502 N.E.2d 1.
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Flores'35 concerned a medical negligence based wrongful death
action' 36 on behalf of the deceased spouse and children.' 37 The complaint
The trial court
was amended, naming respondents in discovery.' 38
ultimately allowed plaintiff to further amend her complaint, adding two of
the RIDs as defendants.' 39 These RIDs challenged the trial court decision,
urging that they were not named as defendants within six months after their
designation as RIDs.14 0 The trial court dismissed the former RIDs from the
litigation and plaintiff appealed.141
Here, two different limitations periods applied to the lawsuit. The
limitations period applicable to the children's claims had not expired by the
time plaintiff sought conversion of the RIDs to defendants 4 2 but plaintiff's
motion to convert the RIDs was not made within the limitations period
applicable to the spouse.14 3 The appellate court held that although the
spouse's claims on her own behalf were time barred and the RIDs were not
subject to conversion for those claims, plaintiff could simply prosecute an
action on behalf of the children as the statute of limitations regarding their
claims had not expired.'" The appellate court stated:
We believe that the six-month period must be construed only to extend,
and never to foreshorten, the limitations period. Section 2-402 is irrelevant
to motions to add defendants made within the limitations period for a
cause of action, even if the plaintiff previously named the new defendant
as a respondent in discovery.145
Therefore, the argument that the RID statute is a more specific statute
of limitations than the usually applicable statute of limitations and must be
followed to the exclusion of an otherwise applicable limitations period will
not succeed.
If a motion to convert the RID to a defendant is denied or plaintiff's
counsel simply agrees not to convert the RID to a defendant, what is the
appropriate procedure by which to liberate the RID from the lawsuit? The
RID statute does not so provide,14 6 but the RID should seek a court order

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 70, par. 1.
See Flores,149 Ill. App. 3d at 373, 502 N.E.2d at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 373-74, 502 N.E.2d at 2-3.
Id.
Id. at 378, 502 N.E.2d at 5.
Id. at 376, 502 N.E.2d at 4.
See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402 (2010).
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terminating the RID status.147 The RID's motion for termination of RID
status is not a prohibited motion to dismiss 48 and accomplishes the goal of
the RID.14 9 Assuming that the statutes of limitation and repose have
expired, the former RID will not be made a defendant but remains subject
to a deposition 50 or trial subpoena.
VIII. EPILOGUE
Does the RID statute"' occupy a valuable and meaningful place in
Illinois civil procedure? The statute is not well written. An examination of
the statute yields more questions than answers. The statute was created with
physicians in mind; however, it now applies to all civil actions.' 52 To the
extent that the early supporters of the statute envisioned a vehicle to
appease physicians-to require their participation in litigation as nonparties with the opportunity for an early escape-that goal has been
frustrated by the appellate court'53 and the statute.154 As previously
discussed, the requirements for conversion are not onerous. 5 5 The RID can
become a defendant if the conversion period has expired but the statute of
limitations/repose has not.'5 6 The six month conversion period can
essentially lengthen an otherwise expired limitations period. 57 To the
extent that plaintiff's counsel may lawfully seek extensions of the
conversion period,'58 the RID may remain in legal "limbo" rather deep into
litigation. This uncertainty will require the RID to assume that conversion
will occur, since the evidence necessary for conversion is not great, and
prepare the same defense which would have been required if the RID had
been named as an original defendant.
Frankly, a case could be made for repeal of the RID statute based
upon the prior examination of the statute and review of the case law

147. A motion to terminate RID status is not filed by a party.
148. Shanklin v. Hutzler, 294 Ill. App. 3d 659, 666, 691 N.E.2d 7, 12 (1st Dist. 1998).
149. See Montclair-Bohl v. Janssen Pharm., No. 06 C 2166, 2006 WL 2700013 at *3 (N.D. 111.Sept.
13, 2006).
150. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402.
151. Of course if the former RID gave a deposition as RID, it could be argued that another deposition,
pursuant to subpoena, would constitute harassment.
152. See infra, section RI.
153. Flores v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp., 149 Ill. App. 3d 371, 376, 502 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1st Dist. 1986).
154. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402.
155. See infra, section VII.
156. Flores, 149 111. App. 3d at 374, 502 N.E.2d at 3.
157. Id.
158. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402. See Knapp v. Bulin, 392 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1024, 911 N.E.2d 541,
547 (1st Dist. 2009) (recognizing that the current RID statute provides for extensions of the
conversion period).

HeinOnline -- 35 S. Ill. U. L.J. 724 2010-2011

Respondents in Discovery

2011]

725

interpreting it. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 22459 provides a vehicle for
pre-lawsuit discovery limited to the identification of defendants,1 60 and does
not, by its terms, operate to relax the statute of limitations or repose.' 6 ' The
RID statute largely benefits the plaintiff who is relieved from a certain
degree of pre-suit investigation.
In conclusion, perhaps despite the efforts of the proponents of the RID
statute, the statute provides little comfort to the RID. A different result
might occur in a state in which its highest court would embrace tort reform,
but that does not appear likely in Illinois.162 The statute is interpreted in a
fashion that encourages conversion and seems to provide plenty of time
within which conversion may occur. It is simply not RID friendly and does
not further the goals of a meaningful code of civil procedure.
IX. APPENDIX-SELECTED RESPONDENT IN DISCOVERY CASE
LAW
A. History of Statute
Murphy v. Giardina,82 Ill.2d 529, 413 N.E.2d 399 (1980).
B. RIDs Not Parties
Delestowicz v. Labinsky, 288 Ill. App. 3d 637, 681 N.E.2d 1008 (1st Dist.
1997).
Shanklin v. Hutzler, 294 Ill. App. 3d 659, 691 N.E.2d 7 (1st Dist. 1997).
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